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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
 
STATE OF IDAHO,    ) 
      ) 
 Plaintiff-Respondent,  ) NO.  44193 
      ) 
v.      ) KOOTENAI COUNTY  
      )  NO. CR 2011-14619 
LANCE JOHNSON,    )  
      )  APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
 Defendant-Appellant.  ) 
________________________________) 
 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 Pursuant to a plea agreement, thirty-two-year-old Lance Johnson pleaded guilty 
to felony money laundering.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, 
with five years fixed, suspended the sentence, and placed Mr. Johnson on probation for 
a period of four years.  Mr. Johnson subsequently admitted to violating his probation, 
and the district court went beyond the recommendations of the parties by revoking 
probation and executing a modified unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  
On appeal, Mr. Johnson asserts the district court when it revoked his probation, abused 
its discretion by ordering his sentence into execution. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
 Kootenai County Sheriff’s Department deputies initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle 
for speeding.  (Presentence Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.2.)  A deputy contacted the 
driver and sole occupant, Mr. Johnson.  (PSI, p.2.)  The deputy noted the vehicle 
smelled strongly of air freshener, there were multiple air fresheners in the vehicle, and 
Mr. Johnson had difficulty getting his license and insurance information because of 
shakiness.  (PSI, p.2.)  Mr. Johnson opened the center console when asked for the 
vehicle’s rental agreement, revealing cash wrapped in a rubber band.  (PSI, p.2.)   
 The deputies asked Mr. Johnson to step out of the vehicle to accept his written 
citation, and Mr. Johnson acted very nervous.  (PSI, p.2.)  Mr. Johnson reportedly 
denied being in possession of contraband but admitted to having $1500 in the console.  
(PSI, p.2.)  Mr. Johnson gave consent to search the vehicle, and a deputy found drug 
paraphernalia with residue in the console.  (PSI, p.2.)  The deputy eventually found 
OxyContin, marijuana, paraphernalia, and a total of $45,782 of cash in the vehicle.  
(PSI, p.2.)  Mr. Johnson later reportedly admitted he had been travelling from Minnesota 
to Oregon to purchase drugs.  (PSI, p.2.) 
 The State charged Mr. Johnson by Information with one count of money 
laundering, Idaho Code § 18-8201, one count of attempted trafficking in marijuana, 
I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1), one count of possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), I.C. § 37-2732(c), one count of possession of a controlled 
substance, I.C. § 37-2732(c)(3), and one count of possession of paraphernalia, 
I.C. § 37-2734A.  (R., pp.56-58.) 
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 Pursuant to a binding plea agreement, Mr. Johnson agreed to plead guilty to 
money laundering, and the State agreed to dismiss the other counts.  (See R., p.60.)  
The district court accepted Mr. Johnson’s guilty plea.  (R., p.60.)  The district court 
imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with five years fixed, suspended the sentence, 
and placed Mr. Johnson on probation for a period of four years.  (R., pp.66-71.)  After 
about a year, Mr. Johnson transferred his supervision to North Dakota.  (See PSI, p.31.) 
 About one-and-one-half years later, the district court issued a Bench Warrant on 
the basis that probable cause existed to believe Mr. Johnson was in violation of his 
probation by committing new crimes.  (R., p.74.)  The Bench Warrant was served about 
two years later.  (See R., p.75.)  In the intervening period, Mr. Johnson had been 
incarcerated in North Dakota and then paroled.  (See Tr., p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.4.) 
 Mr. Johnson initially entered a denial to the alleged probation violation.  
(R., p.77.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Johnson subsequently agreed to admit to 
violating his probation by pleading guilty in North Dakota to the new crimes of five 
counts of possession of a controlled substance, Class C Felony, one count of 
possession of a controlled substance, Class B Misdemeanor, one count of possession 
of drug paraphernalia, Class C Felony, two counts of possession with intent to deliver a 
controlled substance “marijuana”, Class B Felony, one count of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to deliver, Class A Felony, and one count of ingesting a 
controlled substance, Class A Misdemeanor.  (R., p.78; Tr., p.4, L.18 – p.10, L.4; see 
PSI, pp.31-46.)  The district court accepted Mr. Johnson’s admission.  (R., p.78; 
Tr., p.10, Ls.5-6.) 
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 The State recommended Mr. Johnson serve 180 days total for the violation and 
be sent back to North Dakota.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.2-5.)  The State informed the district court 
that, based on conversations with defense counsel, its understanding was North Dakota 
would be required to accept Mr. Johnson back if the district court ordered him on 
probation because of the parole status there.  (Tr., p.13, Ls.6-10.)  The State further 
explained Mr. Johnson apparently “did two years of prison and he was then released.  It 
appears that he probably did a good prison term and was early released on parole, 
according to what my understanding is from the parole officer.”  (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.)  The 
State requested that the district court impose 180 days of jail and then place 
Mr. Johnson on probation for a new period of six years.  (Tr., p.15, Ls.16-25.) 
 Mr. Johnson’s defense counsel indicated Mr. Johnson had been sentenced to 
five years in prison in North Dakota but was paroled after serving two years.  (See 
Tr., p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.4; see also PSI, pp.36-40, 42-45 (North Dakota criminal 
judgments imposing five-year sentences on Mr. Johnson).)  Defense counsel also told 
the district court “that because Mr. Johnson is already in a parole status in North 
Dakota, the state of North Dakota has a mandatory acceptance of the interstate case.”  
(Tr., p.18, Ls.5-8.)  Defense counsel did not know what the Idaho Department of 
Correction’s stance would be.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.8-11.)  Defense counsel further 
emphasized Mr. Johnson was “on parole now in North Dakota and that he has virtually 
no connection to Idaho.  His only connection to Idaho ever, you know, going back in this 
case was that he drove through the state.”  (Tr., p.18, Ls.21-25.)  Thus, Mr. Johnson 
requested the district court impose 180 days of jail and commute the sentence, or 
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alternatively consider the State’s recommendation to impose some jail time and place 
him back on probation.  (See Tr., p.19, Ls.14-19, p.20, Ls.7-13.)  
 The district court stated, “I disagree with the plea agreement today.  I don’t think 
reinstating you on probation is the appropriate sentence.  I certainly don’t think 
commuting is the appropriate sentence.”  (Tr., p.22, Ls.10-13.)  The district court did not 
believe reinstatement on probation would adequately protect the community or deter 
others.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.15-21.)  Thus, the district court went beyond the recommendations 
of the parties by revoking Mr. Johnson’s probation and executing a modified unified 
sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.  (R., pp.80-81.) 
 Mr. Johnson filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Judgment on 
Probation Violation.  (R., pp.82-85.) 
 
ISSUE 
Did the district court, when it revoked Mr. Johnson’s probation, abuse its discretion by 
ordering into execution his modified unified sentence of ten years, with three 
years fixed? 
 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court, When It Revoked Mr. Johnson’s Probation, Abused Its Discretion By 
Ordering Into Execution His Modified Unified Sentence  
 
Mr. Johnson asserts the district court, when it revoked his probation, abused its 
discretion by ordering into execution his modified unified sentence, because the district 
court could only reasonably conclude from his conduct that probation was achieving its 
rehabilitative purpose.  The district court should have instead followed the 
recommendations of the parties by either imposing 180 days of jail and then commuting 
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the sentence, or alternatively imposing 180 days of jail and then placing Mr. Johnson 
back on probation. 
“A district court’s decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal 
absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.”  State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 
102, 105 (2009).  Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation 
revocation proceeding.  Id. at 105.  First, the appellate court reviews the district court’s 
finding on “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.”  Id.  “If it is 
determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second 
question is what should be the consequences of that violation.”  Id. 
Mr. Johnson concedes he admitted to violating his probation.  (R., p.78; Tr., p.4, 
L.18 – p.10, L.4; see PSI, pp.31-46.)  When a probationer admits to a direct violation of 
his probation agreement, no further inquiry into the question is required.  State v. 
Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 50 (Ct. App. 1992).  Thus, this Court may go to the second 
step of the analysis and determine whether the district court abused its discretion when 
it revoked Mr. Johnson’s probation.  The district court may revoke probation if it 
reasonably concludes from the defendant’s conduct that probation is not achieving its 
rehabilitative purpose.  State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989).  The 
district court may consider the defendant’s conduct both before and during the 
probationary period.  State v. Roy, 113 Idaho 388, 392 (Ct. App. 1987).   
Here, the district court could only reasonably conclude from Mr. Johnson’s 
conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose.  The consensus among 
the parties was that Mr. Johnson seemed to have served a “good prison term” in 
North Dakota.  As defense counsel discussed during the probation violation disposition 
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hearing, his staff had been in contact with Mr. Johnson’s parole officer, John Knudsten.  
(See Tr., p.10, Ls.20-23, p.11, Ls.17-21, p.17, Ls.20-22.)  Mr. Knudsten was apparently 
unavailable to testify telephonically at the hearing.  (See Tr., p.11, Ls.17-21.)  Defense 
counsel told the district court Mr. Knudsten had not seen Mr. Johnson’s file himself, but 
“he’s familiar with the prison system out there.  And he knows that if Mr. Johnson got 
five years of prison, but got out in two that Mr. Johnson must have done rather well 
while incarcerated . . . .”  (Tr., p.17, L.22 – p.18, L.5.) 
Similarly, the State told the district court, “[a]pparently, [Mr. Johnson] did two 
years of prison and he was then released. It appears that he probably did a good prison 
term and was early released on parole, according to what my understanding is from the 
parole officer.”  (Tr., p.15, Ls.5-9.)  The State’s recommendation for 180 days jail time 
followed by probation took into account “that he served two years in prison in the 
meantime on top of that.”  (See Tr., p.15, Ls.11-15.) 
Additionally, North Dakota would be required to accept Mr. Johnson if he were 
placed on probation in this case because of his parole status in North Dakota.  
Mr. Johnson’s defense counsel stated, “[b]ut as far as North Dakota’s correctional 
system is concerned, that’s a mandatory acceptance.  They have to accept an interstate 
compact from Idaho to North Dakota because he is in parole status.”  (Tr., p.18, Ls.12-
16.)  Defense counsel also noted Mr. Knudsten had indicated he was willing to accept 
Mr. Johnson back on an interstate probation.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-19.)  Thus, defense 
counsel suggested the district court could impose 180 days jail time and then commute 
the sentence so that “Idaho can just clean its hands of Mr. Johnson and leave him to 
whatever fate he has in North Dakota.”  (Tr., p.19, Ls.14-18.) 
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Further, defense counsel informed the district court Mr. Johnson “has virtually no 
connection to Idaho.  His only connection to Idaho ever, you know, going back in this 
case was that he drove through the state.  That’s it.”  (Tr., p.18, Ls.22-25.)  Defense 
counsel asserted commuting the sentence would “impose[] some punishment and it just 
severs the connection, what little connection there is.”  (Tr., p.19, L.18 – p.20, L.1.)  
Mr. Johnson’s defense counsel continued: “This case is really the only connection 
Mr. Johnson has to the State of Idaho and in an odd way, you know, if he were to go 
and do prison and then be released on parole and have to remain in the State of Idaho 
that might cut against some of the goals of sentencing.  Arguably.”  (Tr., p.20, Ls.1-6.) 
In light of the above, the district court could only reasonably conclude from 
Mr. Johnson’s conduct that probation was achieving its rehabilitative purpose.  Thus, 
Mr. Johnson submits the district court, when it revoked his probation, abused its 
discretion by ordering into execution his modified unified sentence. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Mr. Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order 
revoking probation and remand the case to the district court for entry of an order 
imposing 180 days of jail and commuting the sentence, or alternatively an order 
imposing 180 days of jail and placing Mr. Johnson back on probation. 
 DATED this 19th day of October, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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